House Speaker John Boehner speaks to
reporters after a House GOP meeting on the debt ceiling in July 2011. (Chet
Susslin)
By Billy
House
Updated: March 1, 2013 |
6:04 p.m.
March 1, 2013 | 12:53 p.m.
March 1, 2013 | 12:53 p.m.
Who really birthed the sequester? To
hear Republicans tell it, the White House all but single-handedly spawned the
huge across-the-board cuts to defense and domestic programs, the enforcement
“trigger” of the summer 2011 debt-ceiling deal.
But is there
really any “Rosebud” moment to be recollected from that year's agonizing fiscal
negotiations to illustrate that Obama or any other individual, or party, was
solely responsible for conceiving this idea?
House Speaker
John Boehner, R-Ohio, and other Republicans keep insisting that there is, even
while there can be no dispute that they had to collaborate with Democrats in
seeing the sequester become law. Yet Republicans still see some gain in saying
it was Obama who came up with the idea for the sequester, explaining that the
president didn’t want the debt limit to get in the way of his 2012 presidential
campaign. Lately, they have sought to brand the cuts the
"Obamaquester."
Support for
this Republican mantra gained momentum with the release in September of the
book The Price of Politics, by Washington Post Associate Editor Bob Woodward. In
it, Woodward asserts that the sequester was the idea of then-Office
of Management and Budget Director Jacob Lew and White House Director of
Legislative Affairs Rob Nabors. The debate got fresh fodder last weekend when Woodward wrote an op-ed article on the same topic for The Post.
But Democrats
and senior administration officials have said that is not the complete picture
and that Boehner and other Republicans have been engaging in revisionist
history by disingenuously trying to downplay their contributing roles. For
instance, Rep. Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, the top Democrat on the House
Budget Committee, has told National Journal:
“I find it curious that the speaker is now disavowing the deal [the final
2011 Budget Control Act, including the sequestration], considering he had
said he got 98 percent of what he wanted.” He was referring to Boehner saying
during an interview aired Aug. 1, 2011, on the CBS
Evening News that “when you look at this final agreement that
we came to with the White House, I got 98 percent of what I wanted. I’m pretty
happy.”
And on the
House floor Thursday, Minority Whip Steny Hoyer of Maryland pushed back on the
GOP effort to blame the White House for the sequester.
In fact,
Hoyer noted, six days before Republicans
claimed Nabors first presented the sequester idea to them on Capitol Hill
during a July 25, 2011, meeting, a House Republican bill had been passed to
limit government spending — known as the “Cut, Cap, and Balance Act” — that
“had as its fallback a sequester if the objectives of that bill were not
reached.”
Boehner
spokesman Michael Steel responded: “The idea of a sequester dates back to
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in the 1980s. No one is saying President Obama—or
Jack Lew—invented it. The point is that they insisted it be included in the
Budget Control Act, because they didn’t want to face another debate over the
debt limit before the president's reelection.”
With $85
billion in first-year sequestration cuts set to kick in on Friday, it’s worth
looking back on how the idea came to be—if for no other reason than to offer a
lesson in how Republicans and Democrats, Congress and the White House make
policy when there’s a gun to their heads, as was the case in the summer of 2011
when the debt-limit crisis loomed over Washington.
Senior
congressional Republican aides claim that the first time a sequester plan was
broached was during a visit to the Capitol on July 25, 2011, from Nabors, who
met with Boehner’s then-chief of staff, Barry Jackson, and the speaker’s policy
director, Brett Loper.
What Nabors
had to deliver at that meeting was a sequester concept devised at the White
House by Lew and others as a way to end months of haggling over raising the
debt ceiling.
At that time,
Republicans and Democrats deadlocked over rival approaches to extend the $14.3
trillion debt ceiling. There were just 10 days left before the Aug. 2 deadline
by which the Treasury Department said the nation would lose the ability to pay
all of its bills.
Nabors is
described as putting forth to Jackson and Loper during that closed-door meeting
a “sequester” plan as the White House’s latest compromise. Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid also got a similar rundown. The idea was not novel
or plucked out of thin air; such an enforcement process dated from at least the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985—better known as the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act—which set deficit targets and called for a sequester
to go into effect if they were not met.
In this case,
the idea was pitched as a way to address what had been a key issue: how to
accommodate congressional Republicans’ demands for dollar-for-dollar spending
cuts in return for Obama’s request to raise the borrowing authority by $2.1
trillion—and to authorize that entire amount in a single vote so that another
debt-ceiling crisis would not have to be addressed during the 2012 election
year.
The two sides
were seen as fast agreeing on about $900 billion in cuts, some identified in
earlier bipartisan negotiations. But the rub against doing what Obama wanted
was the question of how to ensure Congress would follow through with the
remaining roughly $1.2 trillion in cuts once the full amount of the debt
ceiling he was requesting was already approved. The White House’s proposed
sequester would compel Congress to follow through with the further reductions
by November or face unappealing automatic cuts, split between domestic and
defense spending.
In response,
Boehner aides Jackson and Loper expressed reluctance and skepticism, suggesting
to Nabors that this “sequester” was not as good a plan as one the House
Republicans already had. The Republican strategy had come to involve voting on
about $1 trillion in cuts right away and allowing a smaller debt-limit
increase, then working on more cuts and tax and entitlement reform before
voting on another debt-limit increase in 2012.
But Obama was
ruling that out, even threatening to veto it, arguing that a shorter-term
debt-limit increase could create uncertainty by risking another bitter partisan
fight and a default within only a matter of months.
“The only
bottom line that I have is that we have to extend this debt ceiling through the
next election, into 2013. And the reason for it is we’ve now seen how difficult
it is to get any kind of deal done,” Obama said during a July 22, 2011, news
conference.
The sequester
plan that Nabors outlined at the Capitol was refined, with Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell and Vice President Joe Biden both weighing in.
As part of a final, negotiated deal, called the Budget Control Act, there was
agreement on $900 billion in spending cuts and the creation of a bipartisan
Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which would negotiate the $1.2
trillion more in cuts. If that so-called super committee failed, or if Congress
did not follow through with its recommendation, automatic cuts would begin on Jan.
2, 2013.
Administration
officials do not deny that a sequester plan was discussed at the July 25, 2011,
meeting between Nabors and Jackson and Loper. But they say that was not the
first time the discussion of such an enforcement mechanism—a la Gramm-Rudman-Hollings—had
been brought up in various negotiations, dating from bipartisan talks with
House and Senate members led by Biden earlier in the year. “It was always in
the air,” a senior White House aide told National Journal.
In fact,
there is some outside evidence that this is true, beyond the fact House
Republicans had passed a bill only six days earlier containing its own
sequester back-up plan. News accounts of even earlier talks involving
congressional leaders and Obama at the White House mention the notion of a deal
involving “triggers” that would force Congress to follow through with agreed
cuts.
Democrats
also note that even a plan offered by McConnell which would have given the
president authority to raise the ceiling in several steps would, by its own
nature, have had to also involve a kind of trigger mechanism. Under McConnell’s
plan, the president would have been granted the authority to raise the ceiling
to the full amount requested by the White House in two subsequent tranches,
both of which could be blocked through congressional resolutions of disapproval
that required a two-thirds majority. That gave the White House the opportunity
to raise the debt ceiling while also giving Republicans a chance to vote
against it.
But there was
a part missing in that equation: How do you ensure that $1.2 trillion would be
cut? According to one senior Senate Democratic aide, “That’s where the
sequester came in, but it was a pretty obvious solution since there needed to
be some kind of enforceable mechanism if Republicans were going to go along
with the McConnell plan. They [Republicans] would not accept a plan where they
voted against the second tranches of the ceiling, but were left with no
guarantee that the cuts would actually happen.”
The aide said
that is what Democrats mean when they argue that the sequester came about at
the Republicans’ behest. “We obviously would have been OK with just the $900
billion in cuts, and some kind of an agreement to seek more. But because
Republicans demanded dollar-for-dollar, we were forced to find a way to get
from $900 billion to $2 trillion. It is really ridiculous for them to try to
wriggle out now. If they had not insisted on dollar-for-dollar or had been open
to revenues, the sequester would not exist.”
Van Hollen
also noted that an offer had been made to have revenues, such as closing
special-interest tax loopholes, incorporated into the plan instead. But he said
that Republicans dismissed that, and that they are the ones who decided to
leave the defense cuts in the plan. Those military cuts are the ones House
Republicans now spew the most anger about, and they have even since passed
once-chamber legislation to soften them through deeper cuts to social and
safety-net programs.
All the
while, Democrats reiterated that the final deal—ultimately supported by
majorities in both chambers—was later depicted by Boehner as “98 percent of
what I wanted.”
But a senior
GOP congressional aide has told National Journal it
is simply not fair to refer to that remark by Boehner without also noting the
context in which it was made—that is, that it was made months before the super
committee failed, and after what the aide said had been personal commitments to
Boehner from Reid and Obama that the panel would get its work done.
Based on
those assurances, the aide said, Boehner truly felt that the Budget Control Act
would result in the $1.2 trillion in discretionary spending caps and a package
of entitlement and tax reforms that were being promised, and so he went along
with the agreement, including its sequester trigger. “Obviously, the second
part didn’t happen,” the aide said.
Want to stay ahead of the curve? Sign up for National
Journal’s AM & PM Must Reads. News and analysis to ensure you don’t
miss a thing.